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Abstract 
This study analyses the impact of various audit committee characteristics on firm 
financial performance using the evidence from non-financial UK companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. After recent accounting scandals, the role of the audit 
committee has come under continuous scrutiny. However, there are still few studies 
examining the relationship between audit committee characteristics and firm 
performance, especially within Europe. Hence, this study aims to fill this gap in the 
literature by exploring the above mentioned relation and contributing to the body of 
existing literature.  
The main findings of this study suggest that the features of audit committees have an 
impact on UK firm performance. Our findings suggest that there is a significant 
positive relationship between the audit committee size, frequency of its meetings and 
its financial experience and firm financial performance. On the contrary, the audit 
committee independence appeared to be negatively correlated with firm performance. 
The findings of our study may be used by the shareholders and board of companies to 
make appropriate choices about audit committee characteristics in order to safeguard 
the investments of shareholders. 
Key words: corporate governance, audit committee, firm performance, United 
Kingdom. 
JEL classification: G34, M40, M42. 
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1 Introduction 
The audit committee (hereinafter referred to as “AC“) is regarded as the most important 
board subcommittee due to its specific role of protecting the interests of shareholders in 
relation to financial oversight and control (Mallin, 2007). The primary role of the AC is 
to oversee the firm’s financial reporting process, the review of financial reports, 
internal accounting controls, the audit process and, more recently, its risk management 
practices (Klein, 2002). The above stated is true also about audit committees of UK 
companies which duties have grown after adoption of several Corporate Governance 
Codes starting by Cadbury’s Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
Currently it is the UK Corporate Governance Code adopted in 2010 by Financial 
Reporting Council (formerly the Combined Code) that sets out the main 
recommendations regarding audit committees in UK. The role of audit committees and 
corporate governance as such was particularly strengthened after recent corporate 
scandals.  
There are a limited number of previous studies regarding the relationship between 
different AC attributes, such as its size, frequency of the meetings, financial expertise 
and qualification of its members and the firm financial performance. The number of 
studies is limited especially in Europe, therefore the work studies the sample consisting 
of UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Moreover, the importance of audit committees in Europe has expanded recently after 
the European Commission has proposed a reform of the EU statutory audit. According 
to Federation of European Accountants, this audit reform “brings sweeping changes to 
the role of the AC. One can claim that it sets this committee on a path towards 
becoming a key factor within the corporate governance framework of all EU Member 
States.“1  
AC enhances the integrity of financial statements and reduces the audit risk thereby 
enhancing the quality of reported figures (Contessotto and Moroney, 2013). Although 
companies comply with the regulatory requirements in order to avoid sanctions, not all 
                                                          
1
 FEE (2016). The Impact of the Audit Reform on Audit Committees in Europe, Briefing Paper, 
Federation of European Accountants, Corporate Governance and Company Law. 
2 
 
of such committees are effective in enhancing the companies’ performance (Beasley, 
1996). In other words, the effectiveness of the AC depends on the characteristics of the 
committee not just the existence of the committee. Therefore, the purpose of the study 
is to examine which attributes of AC, if any, lead to better firm financial performance. 
In order to examine the relationship between the AC characteristics and firm 
performance we used a sample of 72 companies that are constituents of FTSE 100. We 
collected data about AC attributes, namely (i) audit committee size, (ii) audit 
committee meetings frequency, (iii) audit committee independence and (iv) audit 
committee financial expertise. We used a data from last 5 years – from 2011 – 2015. 
We excluded financial companies because they have their own governance model. The 
ROE and Tobin’s Q were used as indicators of firm performance and afterwards we ran 
two regressions in fixed effect specifications using a consistent estimator for our 
covariance matrix. Then we performed several robustness tests in order to check for the 
strength of our models substituting some of the independent variables. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from our work is that corporate governance 
matters. We found a significant positive relationship between the AC size, frequency of 
its meetings and its financial experience and firm financial performance. On the 
contrary, we have discovered a negative significant association between AC 
independence and firm performance.  
Besides this section, the dissertation is structured as follows: in the following part, the 
literature review is presented. Firstly, the main theories are being described, afterwards 
the UK corporate governance framework is introduced followed by the main 
definitions. In the same section there is also the description of the main attributes of 
audit committees with the previous studies about them. Next part develops the 
hypotheses. Next part consists of the methodology (model, control variables and 
endogeneity problem) and data followed by the presentation of the results obtained – 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression results. Afterwards the 
robustness tests were conducted. The last part of the work is the conclusion where the 
results and main findings are summarised and limitations are depicted. Moreover, there 
are also some recommendations for future research. 
3 
 
2 Literature Review  
The literature review is crucial for any work since it demonstrates the picture of state of 
knowledge in the area being researched. In this part of the work we will cover at first 
the main theories applicable to the topic. Then we will move to the UK corporate 
governance framework and main definitions necessary for our research. Afterwards we 
will cover the most important AC characteristics – its size, meetings frequency, 
independence and expertise and we will connect the theory with the relevant previous 
literature summarized also in the tables.  
2.1 Main Theories 
The authors viewed the corporate governance from different perspectives in addition to 
different theoretical frameworks. The Agency Theory, Stakeholder Theory, 
Stewardship Theory and Resource Dependence Theory are theories that have been 
recognised by the researchers in order to get insight and better understanding of 
corporate governance issues. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, these theories are 
used as the theoretical framework in order to provide understanding of AC 
characteristics and firm performance (Nelson and Jamil, 2011). 
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
Agency Theory assumes that the interest of the principal and agent varies and that the 
principal can control or reduce this by giving incentives to the agent and incurring 
expenses from activities designed to monitor and limit the self-interest activities of the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hill and Jones, 1992). 
According to Bonazzi and Islam (2006), the principal will ensure that the agent acts in 
the interest of the principal by giving him the incentives and by monitoring his 
activities. 
Among the measures established to reduce the self-serving nature of the agent is an 
independent AC. Therefore in order to reduce information asymmetry, there is the need 
for governance mechanisms such as board subcommittees composed of directors with 
the appropriate attributes such as independence, expertise and experience to prevent or 
reduce the selfish interest of the agent (Wiseman et al., 2012). 
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2.1.2 Stakeholder Theory 
One of the criticisms of the Agency Theory includes the view that it provides with a 
short term perspective and explanation of the purpose of a firm (Freeman, 1984). An 
alternative to an Agency Theory is known as a Stakeholder Theory and it is defined by, 
e.g. Fort and Schipani (2000), as ensuring the conditions of the responsibilities to the 
various stakeholders to create value and co-ordinate the management levels among 
various stakeholders including stockholders, employees, customers, creditors, 
suppliers, competitors, even the whole society. This theory proposes that the essence of 
corporate governance activities is not only to benefit the shareholders but also the other 
relevant stakeholders. However, Jensen (2001) has realised that proponents of the 
Stakeholder Theory have been unable to provide realistic solutions of the numerous 
conflicting interests of stakeholders that businesses need to protect. He therefore 
suggested a strand of Stakeholder Theory which he referred to as the “enlightened 
Stakeholder Theory”. He suggested that a business would not be able to maximise 
shareholders value if any stakeholder is ignored or mistreated. 
Stakeholder Theory is very important in the context of the control mechanisms adopted 
by the companies, such as audit committees that we examine in our work. 
2.1.3 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory suggests that managers are concerned about the welfare of the 
owners and overall performance of the company, this contradicts Agency Theory which 
believes that agents are self-centred and individualistic (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
The theory suggests that managers will do everything in order to achieve the goals of 
shareholders (Boyd et al., 2011). Based on assumptions of the Stewardship Theory, 
Ntim (2009) argued that firm performance will be enhanced if the executives have 
more powers and are trusted to run the firm. The theory suggests that having majority 
executive directors on a committee will increase effectiveness and produce superior 
result than majority independent directors on a committee (Al Mamun et al., 2013). 
This could be because of the technical knowledge of the executive directors about the 
company and industry (Ntim, 2009). The Stewardship Theory assumes that the steward 
is able to unify the different interests of stakeholders and that he willingly acts in a way 
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that will protect the interest and welfare of others (Hernandez, 2012) assuming that the 
actions of the steward are aimed to protect the long-term welfare of the principal.  
Moreover, this theory assumes people are motivated to perform their work by the 
intrinsic reward they derive from their jobs. Thus, the nature of the reward is different 
from the Agency Theory where the focus of the reward to managers is extrinsic in 
nature. In the context of finance firms and based on the assumptions of the Stewardship 
Theory, inside directors will be able to contribute more in decisions of the board 
subcommittees due to their technical expertise, experience and knowledge about the 
company and the finance industry. 
2.1.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
The Resource Dependence Theory studies how the external resources of an 
organization affect its behaviour and thus focuses on interdependence between 
organizations and their external environment. The theory originated in the 1970s with 
the publication of The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik. The board members provide 
resources and board composition relates directly to the ability of the board to bring the 
resources to the company. According to this theory, the AC serves as a source of advice 
and counsel for the board of directors with the goal to bring valued resources to the 
firms. 
2.2 UK Corporate Governance Framework 
The first corporate governance framework within the UK, the Sir Adrian Cadbury’s 
Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (so called “Cadbury 
Report”) was adopted in 1992 as a consequence of the UK financial scandals (e.g. 
Maxwell and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International) of the early 1990s. Since 
then, several regulatory reviews of this framework were undertaken. Currently, there is 
an UK Corporate Governance Code that replaced previous Combined Code setting out 
the standards of good practice in the UK. Moreover, the related guidance for audit 
committees (The Smith Guidance) was published in 2003 to assist company boards in 
making suitable arrangements for their audit committees and also to assist the directors 
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serving on audit committees in carrying out their roles. Best practice requires that every 
board should consider in detail whether its AC arrangements are best suited for the 
particular circumstances. AC practices need to be proportionate to the task and will 
vary according to the size, complexity and risk profile of the company.
2
 
The entire system of business regulation in the UK is described as a ‘market-based 
approach’ which emphasises the company–shareholder relationship. The Financial 
Conduct Authority requires listed companies to provide a ‘comply or explain’ 
statement in their annual report which explains how the corporate governance code has 
been applied by the company. Specifically, an explanation is needed once the code’s 
recommendations are not followed, an approach which differs radically from the 
mandatory requirements in SOX. The code provisions relevant to audit committees and 
financial reporting require the company board to establish an AC of at least three (or 
two for smaller companies) independent non-executive directors, at least one of whom 
has recent and relevant financial experience.
3
 
Moreover, the audit committees are also regulated by IFRS which increased their role 
of monitoring the financial statements for the benefit of the company board. 
Additionally, the European Commission proposals regarding audit committees and 
financial reporting require each AC to have one member with audit experience and one 
with experience in accounting or auditing. The AC should monitor the financial 
reporting process and submit recommendations and proposals to ensure its integrity; 
monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated financial statements; 
supervise the completeness and integrity of the draft audit reports; and monitor the 
effectiveness of the undertakings internal control, internal audit and risk management 
systems (EC, 2011). 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The rule 1.2 of the Guidance on Audit Committees, Financial Reporting Council. 
3
 The rule C.3.1. of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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2.3 Main Definitions 
2.3.1 Audit Committee 
The role of the AC is important to stakeholders as better quality disclosed financial 
reporting might improve market performance. Over time, the role of the AC has 
evolved and has progressively been re-defined from a voluntary monitoring mechanism 
employed in high agency cost situations to improve the quality of information flows to 
shareholders. It is now a key component of the oversight function and the focus of 
increased public and regulatory interest. The current responsibilities of the AC are 
overseeing the accounting, audit and financial reporting processes of the company 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Section 2). The implied expectation is that a suitably 
qualified and committed independent AC acts as a reliable guardian of public interest 
(Abbott et al., 2002). 
The increasing significance of audit committees can be observed also in Europe and the 
UK specifically. The UK Corporate Governance Code contains a new requirement 
effective from 2013 for AC reports to provide for a description of significant issues 
considered by the AC related to the financial statements.
4
 The role of audit committees 
in Europe was also affected by the mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) for the group accounts of all EU-listed companies from 
2005. 
2.3.2 Firm Financial Performance 
There are several ratios how to measure the company performance. Schiuma (2003) 
mentioned accounting-based performance using three indicators: return on assets 
(ROA), the return on total equity (ROE) and return on investment (ROI). These are 
widely used to assess the performance of firms. Even though more sophisticated 
methods such as IRR, CFROI and DCF modelling have come along; ROE has proven 
as a good technique. It focuses on return to the shareholders of the company but on the 
other hand it can obscure a lot of potential problems. Companies can use financial 
strategies in order to artificially maintain healthy ROE and thus hide deteriorating 
                                                          
4
 The rule C.3.8. of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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performance in business fundamentals. On the other hand, ROA avoids the potential 
distortions created by misleading financial strategies. 
Another ratio used to represent firm financial performance is so called Tobin’s Q ratio. 
It is calculated as a market value of the company divided by the replacement value of 
the firm’s assets. 
In our work, we have examined the relationship between various AC attributes and firm 
performance represented by ROE
5
, and Tobin’s Q6 of UK companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
In the table below there are summarized selected performance dimensions and 
indicators based on Santos and Brito (2012).  
Table 01: Firm performance: dimensions and indicators selected
7
 
Dimensions Selected Indicators 
Profitability Return on Assets, EBTIDA margin, Return on investment, Net 
income/Revenues, Return on equity, Economic value added 
Market Value Earnings per share, Stock price improvement, Dividend yield, 
Stock price volatility, Market value added (market value / 
equity), Tobin’s Q (market value / replacement value of assets) 
Growth Market-share growth, Asset growth, Net revenue growth, Net 
income growth, Number of employees growth 
Employee Satisfaction Turn-over, Investments in employees development and training, 
Wages and rewards policies, Career plans, Organizational 
climate, General employees’ satisfaction 
Customer Satisfaction Mix of products and services, Number of complaints, 
Repurchase rate, New customer retention, General customers’ 
satisfaction, Number of new products/services launched 
Environmental Performance Number of projects to improve / recover the environment, 
Level of pollutants emission, Use of recyclable materials, 
Recycling level and reuse of residuals, Number of 
environmental lawsuits 
Social Performance Employment of minorities, Number of social and cultural 
projects, Number of lawsuits filed by employees, customers and 
regulatory agencies 
                                                          
5
 ROE was measured as a percentage of net income to shareholders’ equity. 
6
 Tobin’s Q was measured as the total market value of the firm divided by its total asset value. 
7
 Source: Santos and Brito, 2012. 
9 
 
2.4 Characteristics of Audit Committees and Previous Studies 
It is argued that any differential in performance related to governance is more than 
likely related to the differences in AC characteristics. The key AC attributes according 
to the existing literature which will be further examined relate to: (i) size, (ii) meeting 
frequency, (iii) independence; and (iv) expertise. 
2.4.1 Audit Committee Size 
The first category consists of the size of the AC. On the one hand, the increased 
number of members is argued to provide more effective monitoring and thus improve 
firm performance. On the other hand, what is controversial, according to some authors 
larger audit committees may lead to inefficient governance. Sharma et al. (2009) found 
evidence that the number of AC meetings is negatively associated with multiple 
directorships, an independent AC chair and AC independence. Moreover, they found a 
positive association between the higher risk of financial misreporting and AC size, 
institutional and managerial ownership, financial expertise and independence of the 
board.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code states that “the board should establish an AC of at 
least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two, independent non-executive 
directors.”8  
Several authors examined the AC size and firm performance. In the following tables 
there is an overview of the results of the studies that discovered either negative or 
positive relationship respectively. Important research regarding the board size and firm 
performance was done by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) whose results can be also 
applied to the case of the AC size and firm performance. In their research they stated 
that: “Board composition notwithstanding, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
suggest that large boards can be less effective than small boards. The idea is that when 
boards become too big, agency problems (such as director free-riding) increase within 
the board and the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management 
process. Yermack (1996) tests this view empirically and finds support for it. He 
                                                          
8
 Rule C.3.1. of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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examines the relationship between Tobin’s Q and board size on a sample of large U.S. 
corporations, controlling for other variables that are likely to affect Q. Yermack’s 
results suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between board size and 
Q. Confirming the Yermack finding, Eisenberg et al. (1998) document that a similar 
pattern holds for a sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. The data therefore 
appear to reveal a fairly clear picture: board size and firm value are negatively 
correlated (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).” 
Table 02: Overview of the studies that discovered a negative relationship between AC 
size and firm performance 
Authors and year Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Bozec  
(2005) 
Canada 500 large firms that 
were listed on the 
Canadian Stock 
Exchange the period 
was during 1976 to 
2000. 
Multiple 
regressions 
ROS, ROA, sales 
efficiency, net 
income, 
efficiency and assets 
turnover 
Al-Matari et al. 
(2012) 
Saudia 
Arabia 
135 firms which 
listed on Saudi 
Stock Market in 
2011. 
Multiple 
regressions 
Tobin’s Q 
MoIlah and 
Talukdar  
(2007) 
Bangladesh 55 firms which were 
listed on 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange in 
Bangladesh. The 
data were obtained 
from 2002 to 2004. 
OLS 
regressions 
ROA, ROE, log of 
market  
capitalization 
Table 03: Overview of the studies that discovered a positive relationship between AC 
size and firm performance 
Authors and 
year 
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Reddy et al. 
(2010) 
New 
Zealand 
50 companies over the 
period 1999-2007. 
OLS and 
2SLS 
regression 
techniques 
Tobin-Q and ROA 
Bauer et al. 
(2009) 
US 113 observations (firm-
years) of real estate 
investment trusts firms 
during 2004 and 2006. 
OLS 
regression 
Tobin-Q, ROA, 
ROE and NPM 
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Al-Matari et al. 
(2012) 
 
De Oliveira 
Gondrige et al. 
(2012) 
Kuwait 
 
Brazil 
136 non-financial 
companies. 
 
208 Brazilian 
companies in 2008. 
Multiple 
regression 
Multiple 
regression 
ROA 
 
2.4.2 The Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
The next feature we examined refers to the frequency by which the AC members meet 
together. It is expected that more active audit committees that meets often will be more 
effective monitoring bodies. An audit committee that rarely meets (considered inactive) 
may be less likely to monitor management effectively. The AC meetings frequency in 
the UK is recommended by the Guide on Audit Committees issued by FRC as not less 
than three meetings per year. It is for the AC chairman, in consultation with the 
company secretary, to decide the frequency and timing of its meetings. Although the 
recommendation is to have at least three meetings per year, most of the chairmen 
usually call for more frequent meetings. 
In the following tables there is an overview of previous studies discovering either 
positive or negative relationship between these two variables. 
Table 04: Overview of the studies that discovered a positive relationship between AC 
meetings frequency and firm performance 
Authors and 
year 
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Khanchel 
(2007) 
US 624 US listed and non-
financial firms for the 
period of 
1994-2003. 
Multiple 
regressions 
analyses 
Tobin-Q 
Kyereboah-
Coleman 
(2007) 
Africa 103 listed firms drawn 
from Ghana, South 
Africa, Nigeria 
and Kenya covering 
the five year period 
1997-2001. 
Regressions Tobin-Q 
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Table 05: Overview of the studies that discovered a negative relationship between AC 
meetings frequency and firm performance 
Authors and 
year 
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Hsu and 
Petchsakulwong 
(2010) 
Thailand Public non-life 
insurance companies 
in Thailand over the 
period 2000-2007. 
Truncated 
bootstrapped 
regression 
DEA 
2.4.3 Audit Committee Independence 
When examining the third category, namely the independence of the AC, we have to at 
first define what it means. We measured the independence of the AC by the proportion 
of independent directors over the total number of directors sitting in an AC. The term 
“independent director” is usually used interchangeably with the term “non-executive 
director” what is not correct because not all non-executive directors are independent.  
The approach taken by the UK Cadbury Report was substantially similar in that it 
refers to independent directors as needing to be only independent of management and 
free from any business or other relationship which could affect their independent 
judgment.   
More recently, the UK Higgs Report 2003 on ‘The Review of the Role and 
Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors’ commented on the definition of 
independence as spelt out in the Cadbury Report. It observed that the definition gives 
little guidance as to what the test should entail. The Higgs Report further observed that 
there are over a dozen definitions in the UK, all with different criteria, as promulgated 
by various shareholder bodies. Finally, the definition of independence according to the 
rule B.1.1 of UK Corporate Governance Code is as follows: 
“The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers 
to be independent. The board should determine whether the director is independent in 
character and judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which 
are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement. The board 
should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding 
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the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to its 
determination, including if the director:  
 has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years;  
 has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with 
the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior 
employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;  
 has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance 
related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme;  
 has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior 
employees;  
 holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies;  
 represents a significant shareholder; or  
 has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first 
election.” 
As to the number of independent directors sitting in audit committees of UK 
companies, the UK Corporate Governance Code requires at least 3 independent non-
executive directors.
9
 
An important issue to consider when evaluating the independence of any board or 
committee is the endogeneity of board/committee composition. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) suggest that poor performance leads to increases in board 
independence. In a cross-section, this effect is likely to make firms with independent 
directors look worse, because this effect leads to more independent directors on firms 
with historically poor performance. Both Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat 
and Black (2000) have attempted to correct for this effect using simultaneous-equation 
methods. In particular, these papers lagged performance as an instrument for current 
performance.  
                                                          
9
 The rule C.3.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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The independence of AC has its benefits but also risks. On the one hand, it is argued 
that having an independent AC within the corporation facilitates more effective 
monitoring of financial reporting (Beasley, 1996; Carcello and Neal, 2003) and external 
audits (Abbott et al., 2002; 2004; Carcello and Neal, 2003). On the other hand, being 
completely separate from management could mean that the independent AC members 
see less industry issues and are more likely to side with the auditor requiring less 
negotiations and deliberations and thus fewer meetings. This can have negative impact 
on the level of monitoring (Sharma et al., 2009).  
According to some literature sources, the ideal situation arises if the chair of the AC is 
independent and the most experienced person on the committee due to their pivotal 
role.  
However, Sharma et al. (2009) show that some companies appoint an inside director as 
the AC chair, which consequently leads to less AC independence. Cotter and Silvester 
(2003) conclude that independent directors on audit committees reduce the monitoring 
by debtholders when leverage is low. The result is that executives on the AC lead to 
increased monitoring by debtholders. Additionally, Beasley and Salterio (2001) find 
that a board chair or CEO on the AC reduces the overall effectiveness of the AC.  
The independence of the AC may also be influenced by other governance mechanisms. 
For example, blockholders also form part of the external governance structure but their 
influence is often exerted internally. Klein (2002) showed a negative association 
between AC independence and the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms, 
such as blockholders, although her results are inconclusive. On the contrary, Morck et 
al. (1988) and Jensen (1993) claim that the presence of outside blockholders serving on 
the board enhances governance because these directors have both the financial 
incentives and the independence to effectively evaluate and monitor management and 
their policies. Moreover, they have incentives to align their interests with those of 
management. 
In summary, the AC independence research suggests the percentage of independent 
directors, grey-directors, AC chair independence, presence of the CEO and 
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representation of blockholders on the AC may all have an impact on firm performance 
via the effectiveness of the AC. 
There are only few studies that examined the relation between AC independence and 
firm performance. The overview of the studies that found out positive relationship is 
presented in the table below. 
Table 06: Overview of the studies that discovered a positive relationship between AC 
independence and firm performance 
Authors and 
year  
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Dey  
(2008) 
US 371 firms through 
2000 to 2001. 
Multiple 
regressions 
ROA and Tobin-
Q 
Nuryanah and 
Islam  
(2011) 
Indonesia From 315 listed 
companies, only 46 
companies were 
selected for this study. 
The sample data was 
selected from financial 
sectors over 2002 
2004. 
Multiple 
regression 
Tobin-Q 
Yasser et al. 
(2011) 
Pakistan 30 Pakistan listed firms 
through 2008-2009. 
Multiple 
regressions 
ROE and NPM 
On the other hand, there are some studies that discovered a negative relationship 
between AC independence and variables representing firm performance. The summary 
of such studies is illustrated in the table below. 
Table 07: Overview of the studies that discovered a negative relationship between AC 
independence and firm performance 
Authors and 
year  
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Dar et al. 
(2011) 
Pakistan This study selected 11 
oil and gas firms listed 
on the Karachi stock 
exchange and this 
study chooses non-
profitability just over 
2004-2010. 
Multiple 
regressions 
ROE 
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2.4.3 Audit Committee Financial Expertise  
The final category of AC characteristics that might influence the performance relates to 
the financial expertise which consists of both experience and education. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code states in regards with the expertise that “the board should 
satisfy itself that at least one member of the AC has recent and relevant financial 
experience.”10 
Recent research confirms that accounting expertise within boards that are characterised 
by strong governance contributes to greater monitoring by the AC and leads to 
enhanced conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). 
It is widely recognized that within each AC, the chair fulfils a key leadership role and 
therefore should be the most qualified person on the AC. Spira (1999) claims where the 
AC chair has sufficient auditing background; it is very likely that the chair and the CFO 
will form a good working relationship. Although it is recognised that the chair of AC 
should have experience, DeZoort (1998) finds contrary evidence that 76% of AC chairs 
do not have any auditing experience.  
Experience alone may not be sufficient to establish financial expertise. Both experience 
and education are required to become a financial expert (Giacomino et al., 2009). 
However, the research on this topic is very limited in part due to low incentives to 
disclose information on backgrounds and careers of directors prior to the post-Enron 
governance regulatory boom.  
In the table below, there is a summary of studies proving the positive relationship 
between AC expertise and firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Rule C.3.1. of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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Table 08: Overview of the studies that discovered a positive relationship between AC 
expertise and firm performance 
Authors and 
year  
Location Sample Methods Dependent 
Variable 
Rashidah and 
Fairuzana 
(2006) 
Malaysia 100 companies listed 
on Malaysia stock 
exchange. 
Multiple 
regression 
ROE 
Hamid and 
Aziz 
(2012) 
Malaysia The sample of 
government linked 
companies in Malaysia 
over the period of 
2005-2010. 
Multiple 
regression 
ROA 
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3 Hypotheses Development 
Pursuant to above mentioned, the AC is considered as an additional internal governance 
mechanism whose impact should improve the quality of financial reporting of a 
company and thus its performance. In this respect, an AC has four main characteristics 
that should be taken into consideration, these are; AC independence, AC expertise, AC 
size, and AC meetings.  
In the research, we consider the size of the AC (measured by the number of members of 
AC), its independence (measured as a ratio of independent directors sitting in AC to the 
total number of its members), financial expertise (measured as a proportion of the 
members with recent and relevant financial experience to the total number of AC 
members), and frequency of AC meetings (measured by the number of meetings held 
per year).  
As concluded from previous studies, it is expected that the AC size and financial 
experience is positively related to firm performance, as well as both AC independence 
and number of meetings per year would have a positive correlation with firm 
performance. However, as stated in literature review, there were also some studies that 
proved the contrary situation, so we believe it is necessary to test these four hypotheses 
in order to discover the relationship between AC attributes and firm performance of the 
British companies listed on the London Stock Exchange:   
H10: There is no relationship between the AC size and firm performance. 
H11: AC size has a positive relationship with firm performance.  
H20: There is no relationship between the AC financial expertise and firm 
performance. 
H21: AC financial expertise has a positive relationship with firm performance.  
H30: There is no relationship between the frequency of AC meetings and firm 
performance. 
H31: The frequency of AC meetings has a positive relationship with firm 
performance.  
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H40: There is no relationship between the independence of AC and firm performance. 
H41: Greater independence of the AC is associated with higher firm performance. 
Figure 01: Overview of variables 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm 
performance 
(represented 
by ROE and 
Tobin's Q) 
- AC size 
- AC financial expertise 
- AC meetings 
- AC independence  
- firm size 
- leverage 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
Control variables 
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4 Methodology and Data 
4.1 Methodology 
Fixed effect panel data regression model was used to analyse panel data for examining 
the association of AC characteristics with financial performance of firms. The 
regression was performed in statistical program Eviews 7. The results of Hausman test 
and likelihood ratio redundant fixed effect test supported the use of fixed effect 
estimation method. Baltagi (2005) also supported the use of fixed effect method over 
random effect method of estimation when the sample was not drawn randomly from a 
large population. In our study, the sample of FTSE 100 companies is not drawn 
randomly from the whole population of listed companies. The reason behind 
considering FTSE 100 Index is that it represents about 81% of the market capitalisation 
of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and so the representative of this 
market. 
In our regression analysis, we applied cross-section fixed effects where each cross-
sectional unit got its own dummy variable. This was also supported by the results of 
redundant likelihood ratio test showing that fixed effects are preferred over random 
effects or pooled OLS since the P value is less than 0.05. 
Moreover, we used a consistent estimator for our covariance matrix – white cross-
section that corrects the standard errors for heteroscedasticity. 
4.1.1 Model 
The four main AC attributes explored are: AC size, the frequency of its meetings, the 
number of independent directors and the financial expertise of its members. The 
common proxies used to measure firms‘ accounting performance in previous studies 
are: ROA, ROE, ROI (Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; and Zeitun & Gang Tian, 2007). 
Other measures, based on market performance of firms, as used by many authors are: 
Tobin‘s Q (Mousa et al., 2012; Saibaba, 2013; Sami et al., 2011; and Zeitun & Gang 
Tian, 2007) and price to earnings ratio (P/E) (Abdel Shahid, 2003). In our study, we 
have used two measures of firm performance that we consider as the most relevant 
measures – Return on equity (ROE) and Tobin‘s Q. ROE is purely accounting measure. 
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Tobin‘s Q mixes market value with accounting measures. Tobin‘s Q is the ratio of 
market value of a firm to the book value of assets.  
In order to examine the relationship between dependent and independent variables, the 
following models were used: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 72 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 5 
(4.1.1) 
𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁′𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 72 , 𝑡
= 1, … , 5 
(4.1.2) 
Where:  
ROEi,t – Return on equity of a given company in a given year 
TOBIN’S Qi,t – Tobin’s Q of a given company in a given year 
ACSIZEi,t - Audit committee size of a given company in a given year 
ACINDEPi,t - Audit committee independence of a given company in a given year 
ACFINEXPi,t - Audit committee financial expertise of a given company in a given year 
ACMEETi,t - Audit committee meetings frequency of a given company in a given year 
FSIZEi,t - Firm size of a given company in a given year  
FLEVi,t - Firm leverage of a given company in a given year 
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 Table 09: Definition of variables11 
VARIABLES MEANING MEASUREMENT 
Dependent variables   
ROE  Return on equity  Measured as a percentage of net 
income to shareholders’ equity  
Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q  Measured as the total market value of 
the firm divided by its total asset value  
Independent variables   
ACSIZE  Audit committee size  Number of audit committee members  
ACINDEP  Audit committee 
independence  
Proportion of independent directors 
over overall audit committee size  
ACFINEXP  Audit committee 
financial expertise  
Proportion of audit committee 
members with financial expertise over 
the total number of audit committee 
members  
ACMEET  Audit committee 
meeting frequency  
Number of meetings held in respective 
year 
Control variables   
FSIZE  Firm size  The total assets owned by the firm, 
measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets  
FLEV  Firm leverage  Measured as percentage of total debt 
to total assets  
4.1.2 Control Variables 
The control variables firm size and firm leverage are used in this study to control for 
possible relevant effect of other than the explanatory variables. Some authors, such as 
Kinney and McDaniel (1989) discovered that larger firms have better internal controls, 
better information systems, more resources and therefore the potential for increased 
quality reporting that leads, in turn, to improved firm performance. On the other hand, 
firm size influence on the corporate governance is evident in the findings that show 
large companies to be less effective compared to the smaller ones because although 
they meet government requirements, they have higher agency issues and more 
ambiguity (Patro et al., 2003). We control for size effects including the control variable 
                                                          
11
 Source: Amer, M., Ragab, A., & Shehata, S. (2014). 
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FSIZE, measured as a natural logarithm of total assets (Bronson et al., 2009, Sharma et 
al., 2009). 
The second control variable used was the firm leverage. It can be justified by the belief 
that any firm performance measure needs to be adjusted for systematic risk of the firm. 
Therefore we control for the leverage adding the variable FLEV which is measured as 
a percentage of total debt to total assets. 
4.1.3 Endogeneity Problem 
AC composition and its different attributes could affect the firm performance but the 
same is true the other way around too. Therefore if the AC composition is endogenous, 
regression coefficients can be biased. The problem of endogeneity has been addressed 
in numerous governance research before (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Black et al., 2006; 
Schultz et al., 2010). Endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent estimators and this 
reduces the confidence we may have in drawing conclusions from the research 
(Chenhall and Moers, 2007). While it is present in much empirical research, we believe 
the nature of the propositions being tested and the research design provide reasonable 
control for endogeneity and other econometric issues. 
4.2 Data 
For our study, we have used a sample of 72 British non-financial companies listed in 
the London Stock Exchange included in FTSE 100 Index that have audit committees 
and disclosed the information necessary for our study. FTSE 100 Index is the index of 
the 100 biggest companies in terms of market capitalization listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. It represents about 81% of the total market capitalisation of London Stock 
Exchange. We decided to use the top companies within the UK and our final sample 
consists of 72 non-financial companies. The companies have been chosen from 
different industries
12
, with the exception of financial industry, since its corporate 
governance differs to the large extent and such sample would be exposed to some bias. 
The study is restricted to listed companies, because of the fact that they publish the 
                                                          
12
 The overview of the companies along with the respective industries can be observed from the Annex 1 
to this work. 
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financial statements that are necessary for our study and also the majority of the rules 
apply only to listed companies. 
The study covers the period of five years from 2011-2015. 
There are three types of data that were used for our analysis: 
 Data on audit committees13 – as we are not aware of any database containing 
the necessary data regarding the audit committees, we have obtained them from 
the annual reports of selected companies for 2011-2015, especially from the 
part “Audit Committee Report“, where the company reports about its AC 
activity, members, meetings, etc. 
When obtaining the data about AC size, independent and experienced members, 
it is important to note that sometimes these numbers differed thorough the year. 
In such cases, we considered the number in the end of a given year. However, 
the audit committees usually changed or replaced the members by the end of the 
year. 
 Data on firm performance – necessary data for ROE and Tobin’s Q calculation; 
these data were obtained and calculated from financial statements of selected 
companies. 
 Data regarding the control variables – firm’s size was measured by obtaining 
data about the total assets of the company and firm leverage by the proportion 
of debt to equity in a company’s capital structure. 
Most of the time, the total assets value was stated in British pounds but 
sometimes different currencies such as US dollars or Euro were used. In those 
cases, we converted the currency using the exchange rates applicable in a given 
year.
14
 Moreover, in one of the robustness test performed, we needed to obtain 
the data on market capitalisation of the companies included in our sample for 
the years 2011-2015. This data was also obtained from the financial statements. 
  
                                                          
13
 The data on audit committees can be observed fom the Annex 2 to this work. 
14
 This was done using official exchange rates obtained from the database of Bank of England, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/Rates.asp. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The results of descriptive statistics are given in the Table 10. On average, there are 4 
members of audit committees in the British companies. The minimum number of the 
AC members is 3 as it is the legal requirement and the maximum is 8. They meet 5 
times in a year on average. However, it is interesting to note the differences between 
the meetings frequency. While some of the AC meet only once per year, others meet on 
a monthly basis. Nearly 42% of AC members are considered as having recent and 
relevant financial experience and around 98% of the members are considered to be 
independent pursuant to the UK Corporate Governance Code. The average return on 
equity was found to be 18.11% during the examined period and the average Tobin’s Q 
ratio was 1.82. 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics 
Variables
15
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum  Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
ACSIZE 4.334302 4.000000 8.000000 3.000000 1.193465 1.065175 4.032258 
ACMEET 4.985465 5.000000 13.00000 1.000000 1.773573 1.516689 6.077521 
ACINDEP 0.984302 1.000000 1.000000 0.200000 0.095148 -7.080670 54.56633 
ACFINEXP 0.416739 0.333333 1.000000 0.125000 0.258645 1.173500 3.136462 
FSIZE 0.927433 0.875709 2.360978 -2.208310 0.604473 -0.204640 4.956857 
FLEV 0.873796 0.584650 6.540000 -15.67000 1.353169 -4.275370 68.66778 
ROE 18.10948 15.70500 179.6300 -66.01000 18.54916 1.981282 21.55090 
Tobin’s Q 1.892222 1.185000 24.83000 -0.164600 2.791216 5.984757 43.77849 
As we can see from the table above, there are some “outliers“ among our data, 
especially in ROE sample, with standard deviation of 18.54916. Therefore, we have 
decided to apply to following rule in order to decide if keeping the respective value of 
ROE or dropping it from our regression. We have kept the values that belong to this 
interval:
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[𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 3 × 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 3 × 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛]    (5.1) 
 
                                                          
15
 Sample size (n) = 72 firms, Time periods (T) = 5 years. 
16
 It is important to note that we have performed the regression both with and without outliers values of 
ROE and the results obtained were not differing substantially. However dropping the “outliers” boosted 
our results. 
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5.2 Correlation Analysis 
Furthermore, we have performed the correlation analysis of independent variables in 
order to discover possible correlation among them. This was done because to obtain the 
unbiased results of the regression, it is necessary that the variables do not correlate with 
each other. From the table below it is obvious that none of the variables are highly 
correlated. 
Table 11: Correlation matrix 
 ACSIZE ACMEET ACINDEP ACFINEXP FSIZE FLEV 
ACSIZE 1      
ACMEET 0.032604 1     
ACINDEP -0.066620 -0.104730 1    
ACFINEXP -0.324510 -0.078910 0.069416 1   
FSIZE 0.155497 0.377897 -0.167610 -0.051310 1  
FLEV 0.046181 -0.029820 -0.156090 0.062099 -0.022730 1 
5.3 Analysis of Regression Results 
Finally, empirical analysis was done using fixed effect panel data regression. Two 
dependent variables (ROE and Tobin‘s Q) were considered in separate models to 
observe the effect of the corporate governance on each performance measure 
separately. Results were carried at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level. Below the 
results of regressions are presented for each performance measure separately. 
5.3.1 ROE as a Dependent Variable 
Firstly, AC characteristics represented by independent variables were regressed against 
the dependent variable – ROE and thus their impact was analysed.  In this regression 
we used the panel regression specification since it boosts the power of statistical 
analysis and we applied the fixed effects model. Firstly, we have used the random 
effects model but after performing the Hausman test, it suggested to reject null 
hypothesis and thus random effects model appeared as not suitable for this regression. 
Consequently, we run regression in fixed effects specifications using a consistent 
estimator for our covariance matrix and performed likelihood ratio test confirming the 
use of cross-sectional fixed effects.  
The results of the regression are presented in the table below. 
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Table 12: Regression analysis results for ROE using fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents the estimates of the equation (4.1.1). The standard errors are presented between 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
The variables included in the regression are: ROE (measured as a percentage of net income to 
shareholders’ equity), ACSIZE (the number of AC members), ACFINEXP (the proportion of members 
with the recent and relevant financial experience to the overall number of AC members), ACMEET (the 
number of AC meetings held in respective year), ACINDEP (the proportion of independent members to 
the overall number of AC members), FSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of the total assets) and 
FLEV (measured as a percentage of total debt to total assets). 
It is important to note that the R-squared value is around 10.94% indicating that only 
10.94% of ROE variations are determined by the AC characteristics used in the 
regression, namely the AC size, the frequency of AC meetings, the independence of 
AC members and the financial experience of AC members. Whereas the remaining 
89.06% of variations is attributed to other variables. However, R-squared has also some 
limitations, for example it cannot determine whether the coefficients predictions and 
estimates are biased. Moreover, it does not necessarily indicate if a model is adequate. 
Therefore, even if the R-squared value is low but the predictors are statistically 
significant, as we can see from the table below, it is still possible to draw important 
conclusions about how changes in the predictive value are associated in the response 
value. Regardless of the value of R-squared, the coefficients that are significant still 
Independent variables ROE 
Intercept 4.968897 
(4.866478) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
1.413908*** 
(0.321822) 
1.953980*** 
(0.839501) 
ACMEET 0.184835*** 
(0.021856) 
 
ACINDEP -1.080597* 
(0.668504) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-3.676244* 
(2.227430) 
1.055618 
(0.826902) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted  R-squared  
F-statistic               
Prob (F-statistic) 
340 
0.109373 
0.082302 
4.040263 
0.000030 
 
28 
 
represent the mean change in the response for one unit of change in the predictor while 
keeping other predictors in the model constant.  
The model is considered to be overall statistically significant, giving the prob F-
statistics value of nearly 0.000 and therefore rejecting the null hypothesis of 
insignificance. It means that the variables we use in the regression specification can 
jointly predict the firm performance in our sample of the UK companies. 
Our first hypothesis (H11) states that there is a potentially positive relationship between 
the AC size and firm performance measured by ROE. The results of the regression are 
consistent with this hypothesis. This implies that the AC size can potentially positively 
influence the firm performance and it is supporting the finding of Bauer et al. (2009) 
who found out also positive significant relationship between the AC size and the firm 
performance measured by ROE of the US companies. On the other hand, our result is 
inconsistent with the finding of MoIlah and Talukdar (2007), who discovered 
a negative significant relationship between the above mentioned variables bringing the 
evidence from Bangladesh. Furthermore, our finding is also inconsistent with the 
results of Mak and Kusnadi (2005) who could not provide any relationship between the 
size of AC and firm performance in Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, it is also 
contradictory to the stating of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) who found a negative 
significant relationship between the board size in general and the firm performance. 
The second hypothesis (H21) predicts that the financial expertise of AC members is 
positively associated with the firm performance measured by ROE. The results of our 
regression analysis confirm this statement and found positive significant relationship 
between these two variables. This suggests that the more members with recent and 
relevant financial experience sitting in audit committees can bring better financial 
performance of British companies. Such result is consistent with findings of Rashidah 
and Fairuzana (2006) who examined 100 Malaysian companies and also discovered 
that as the AC financial experience increases, the firm financial performance increases 
too. 
The third hypothesis (H31) predicting that higher frequency of AC meetings is 
positively associated with the firm performance was also confirmed by the regression. 
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The results showed the positive relationship significant at 1%. The result obtained is 
consistent with the findings of Carcello (2002). 
The last hypothesis we tested (H41) predicted that the greater independence of the AC is 
associated with higher firm performance. However, we have discovered a negative 
significant relationship between them. Such a result is contradictory to the studies 
finding a positive association between independence and ROE (Yasser et al., 2011) but 
on the other hand consistent with Dar et al. (2011) discovering a negative relationship. 
This can be explained by the fact that independent directors usually suffer from having 
inadequate knowledge of the business that can lead to wrong advice to the board of 
directors and consequently to poorer financial performance. 
As for the control variables, firm size, shows a negative significant relationship, while 
firm leverage suggests a non-significant relationship with ROE. According to this 
result, it seems that the benefits of leverage are cancelled by its costs. The negative 
relationship between ROE and firm size can be explained by the so called “small firm 
effect“. This theory states that smaller firms, or those companies with a small market 
capitalization, outperform larger companies. This market anomaly is a factor used to 
explain superior returns in the Three Factor Model, created by Gene Fama and Kenneth 
French - the three factors being the market return, companies with high book-to-market 
values, and small stock capitalisation. According to the theory this effect exists because 
the small firms have bigger amount of growth opportunities than large companies. 
Moreover, small companies also tend to operate in a more volatile business 
environment.  
As mentioned in a previous part of this work, the results of the regression are presented 
without using “outliers” values of ROE. 
5.3.2 Tobin‘s Q as a Dependent Variable  
Secondly, AC characteristics represented by independent variables were regressed 
against another dependent variable measuring the firm performance – Tobin’s Q. 
Similarly as when testing ROE, we used the panel regression specifications and fixed 
effects model. We also tried to apply random effects model, but after running the 
Hausman test we rejected the null hypothesis and considered using fixed effects model 
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as more suitable. Additionally, the likelihood ratio test shown that fixed effects model 
is suitable, too. 
The results of the regression are presented in the table below. 
Table 13: Regression analysis results for Tobin’s Q using fixed effects 
Independent variables Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 4.244695*** 
(0.517840) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
0.093351** 
(0.041975) 
-0.611123 
(0.354526) 
ACMEET 0.169638*** 
(0.017177) 
ACINDEP -1.092487*** 
(0.066810) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-2.494415*** 
(0.156438) 
0.027589 
(0.033699) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
348 
0.257308 
0.235269 
11.67546 
0.000000 
 
Note: The table presents the estimates of the equation (4.1.2). The standard errors are presented between 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
The variables included in the regression are: Tobin’s Q (measured as a total market value of a firm 
divided by its total asset value), ACSIZE (the number of AC members), ACFINEXP (the proportion of 
members with the recent and relevant financial experience to the overall number of AC members), 
ACMEET (the number of AC meetings held in respective year), ACINDEP (the proportion of 
independent members to the overall number of AC members), FSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of 
the total assets) and FLEV (measured as a percentage of total debt to total assets). 
The value of R-squared in this case was much higher than in the first case, namely it 
reached 25.73%. It indicates that 25.73% of Tobin’s Q variations are determined by the 
AC characteristics that we used in the regression, namely the AC size, the frequency of 
AC meetings, the independence of AC members and the financial experience of AC 
members while the remaining 74.27% of variations is attributed to other variables. 
Although the value of R-squared is higher than in the first model, it is still quite low. 
However, as we mentioned above, even if the R-squared value is low but the predictors 
are statistically significant, it is still possible to draw important conclusions about how 
changes in the predictive value are associated in the response value. Regardless of the 
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value of R-squared, the coefficients that are significant still represent the mean change 
in the response for one unit of change in the predictor while keeping other predictors in 
the model constant. 
The model is considered to be overall statistically significant, giving the prob F-
statistics value equals to 0.000. 
Our first hypothesis (H11) states that there is a positive relationship between the AC 
size and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The results of regression are 
consistent with this hypothesis and are statistically significant. Such a result is similar 
to the first model result regarding ROE. This suggests that the AC size can influence 
the firm performance also in terms of Tobin’s Q and it is supporting the finding of 
Bauer et al. (2009) who found out also positive significant relationship between the AC 
size and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q of the US companies as well as 
finding of Reddy et al. (2010) who discovered this relationship in New Zealand. On the 
other hand, our result is inconsistent with the finding of Al-Matari et al. (2012), who 
discovered a negative significant relationship between the above mentioned variables 
examining the companies from Saudi Arabia.  
The second hypothesis (H21) predicts that the financial expertise of AC members is 
positively associated with the firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. However, the 
coefficient is not significant which implies that the financial experience of the AC 
members cannot influence the firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q neither 
positively, nor negatively. 
Furthermore, the study finds that AC meetings frequency is positively and significantly 
associated with Tobin’s Q what confirms the third hypothesis (H3). It implies that the 
AC meetings positively influence the firm performance. This result is consistent with 
the first model using ROE as a firm performance measure. Moreover, it is supported by 
the finding of Khanchel (2007) who examined the US companies as well as Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) analysing the African companies. 
The last hypothesis we tested (H41) predicted that the greater independence of the AC is 
associated with higher firm performance. Similar to ROE results, the study found that 
there is a significant negative relationship between these two variables. This result is 
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inconsistent with the findings of Dey (2008) and Nuryanah and Islam (2011) who 
found a positive relationship between the AC independence and firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q in the US and Indonesian companies respectively.  
As for the control variables in case of the model with the Tobin’s Q, the results are 
consistent with the model examining ROE. The firm size shows a negative significant 
relationship, while firm leverage shows a non-significant relationship with Tobin’s Q.  
5.4 Robustness Tests 
Further tests were conducted in this study in order to examine if the main results were 
sensitive to different measurements with the purpose to obtain clearer results and also 
to confirm the main findings that were made. 
5.4.1 Log Transformation of Audit Committee Size Variable 
Firstly, the study repeated both regression models using a natural logarithm of the AC 
size instead of a number representing the AC size. This is usually done as to improve 
the model fit by altering the scale and making the variable more normal distributed. As 
we can see from the table below, the results remained the same.  
Table 14: Robustness test No. 1: Comparison of regression analysis results for ROE 
using fixed effects 
Original Model ROE New Model ROE 
Intercept 4.968897 
(4.866478) 
Intercept  1.397546 
(5.014920) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
1.413908*** 
(0.321822) 
1.953980*** 
(0.839501) 
LNACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
9.703961*** 
(1.589770) 
1.551146*** 
(0.892859) 
ACMEET 0.184835*** 
(0.021856) 
 
ACMEET 1.142266*** 
(0.327791) 
ACINDEP -1.080597* 
(0.668504) 
ACINDEP -1.719153* 
(0.809334) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-3.676244* 
(2.227430) 
1.055618 
(0.826902) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-3.557908* 
(2.217452) 
1.102442 
(0.852612) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted  R-squared  
F-statistic               
340 
0.109373 
0.082302 
4.040263 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted  R-squared  
F-statistic   
340 
0.101484 
0.074174 
3.715947 
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Note: The tables present the estimates of the equation (4.1.1). The standard errors are presented between 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
The variables included in the regression are: ROE (measured as percentage of net income to 
shareholders’ equity), ACSIZE (the number of AC members), LNACSIZE (natural logarithm of the 
number of AC members), ACFINEXP (the proportion of members with the recent and relevant financial 
experience to the overall number of AC members), ACMEET (the number of AC meetings held in 
respective year), ACINDEP (the proportion of independent members to the overall number of AC 
members), FSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of the total assets) and FLEV (measured as 
a percentage of total debt to total assets). 
Table 15: Robustness Test No. 1: Comparison of regression analysis results for Tobin’s 
Q using fixed effects 
Original Model Tobin’s Q New Model Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 4.244695*** 
(0.517840) 
Intercept  3.831520** 
(0.628281) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
0.093351** 
(0.041975) 
-0.611123 
(0.354526) 
LNACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
0.541524** 
(0.196353) 
-0.569724 
(0.358909) 
ACMEET 0.169638*** 
(0.017177) 
ACMEET 0.169165*** 
(0.017071) 
ACINDEP -1.092487*** 
(0.066810) 
ACINDEP -1.062034** 
(0.075029) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-2.494415*** 
(0.156438) 
0.027589 
(0.033699) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-2.498467*** 
(0.156470) 
0.028515 
(0.033519) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
348 
0.257308 
0.235269 
11.67546 
0.000000 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted  R-squared  
F-statistic   
Prob (F-statistic)     
348 
0.258085 
0.236070 
11.72299 
0.000000 
Note: The tables present the estimates of the equation (4.1.2). The standard errors are presented between 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
The variables included in the regression are: Tobin’s Q (measured as the total market value of the firm 
divided by its total asset value), ACSIZE (the number of AC members), LNACSIZE (natural logarithm 
of the number of AC members), ACFINEXP (the proportion of members with the recent and relevant 
financial experience to the overall number of AC members), ACMEET (the number of AC meetings held 
in respective year), ACINDEP (the proportion of independent members to the overall number of AC 
members), FSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of the total assets) and FLEV (measured as 
a percentage of total debt to total assets). 
 
 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000030 
 
Prob (F-statistic)     0.000097 
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5.4.2 Market Capitalisation as a Firm Size Indicator 
In our second robustness test, we have substituted the independent variable FSIZE 
representing the firm size being calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets for the 
variable ADJFSIZE being calculated as a natural logarithm of market capitalisation. 
The comparison of the results obtained from running the regression using the second 
model can be observed from the table below: 
Table 16: Robustness test No. 2: Comparison of regression analysis results for Tobin’s 
Q using fixed effects 
Original Model Tobin’s Q New Model Tobin’s Q 
Intercept 4.244695*** 
(0.517840) 
Intercept  0.863555 
(0.731967) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
0.093351** 
(0.041975) 
-0.611123 
(0.354526) 
ACSIZE 
 
ACFINEXP 
0.080541*** 
(0.025931) 
-0.354022 
(0.205106) 
ACMEET 0.169638*** 
(0.017177) 
ACMEET 0.008212* 
(0.011604) 
ACINDEP -1.092487*** 
(0.066810) 
ACINDEP -3.158257*** 
(0.710685) 
FSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-2.494415*** 
(0.156438) 
0.027589 
(0.033699) 
ADJFSIZE 
 
FLEV 
-0.400075*** 
(0.020709) 
0.022423*** 
(0.007450) 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistic 
Prob (F-statistic) 
348 
0.257308 
0.235269 
11.67546 
0.000000 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
Adjusted  R-squared  
F-statistic   
Prob (F-statistic)     
317 
0.969492 
0.959997 
102.1129 
0.000000 
Note: The tables present the estimates of the equation (4.1.2). The standard errors are presented between 
parentheses under each estimated coefficient. Statistical significance is represented by * at 10%, ** at 
5% and *** at 1%. 
The variables included in the regression are: Tobin’s Q (measured as the total market value of the firm 
divided by its total asset value), ACSIZE (the number of AC members), ACFINEXP (the proportion of 
members with the recent and relevant financial experience to the overall number of AC members), 
ACMEET (the number of AC meetings held in respective year), ACINDEP (the proportion of 
independent members to the overall number of AC members), FSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of 
the total assets), ADJFSIZE (measured as a natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of a firm) and 
FLEV (measured as a percentage of total debt to total assets). 
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6 Conclusion 
The overall goal of this study was to examine the relationship between various AC 
characteristics, such as the AC size, the frequency of its meetings, the financial 
expertise of its members and its independence, and the firm performance measured by 
ROE and Tobin’s Q for the UK quoted blue chip companies. The data used comprised 
of 72 non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 100) 
during 5 years period (2011-2015). The study was motivated by the existence of a gap 
of such research in relation to the UK companies. The study adds to the understanding 
of the corporate governance attributes that impact the firm performance, specifically 
with the UK particular environment.  
This study relates to the previous studies regarding the audit committees in the UK (e.g. 
Collier, 1993) and extends it, because previously only the presence as such of audit 
committees was examined, but in our study we went further and we examined the 
different attributes of audit committees and its impact on the firm performance. 
The results of the study suggest that the features of audit committees in UK are relevant 
in terms of the firm financial performance. According to our expectations, the findings 
of the study suggest that a higher number of AC members have a positive impact on 
both ROE and Tobin’s Q. This is in line with the regulator’s requirement of having at 
least 3 members in audit committees.
17
 Such a result is, however, not in favour of the 
agency theory according to which the bigger number of AC members will display 
poorer results. On the contrary, it is in favour of the resource dependence theory stating 
that the bigger audit committee can achieve better results. A small audit committee 
lacks the diversity offered by a large one in terms of skills and knowledge and this 
makes them ineffective. On the other hand, including more independent directors to the 
AC leads to the weaker firm performance measured by both ROE and Tobin’s Q. The 
reason behind this can be explained by the insufficient technical knowledge of 
independent directors and consequently their failure to make a good recommendation to 
the board. Such a result is also consistent with Al Mamun et al. (2013) who discovered 
that including more executive directors to the committee leads to higher effectiveness 
and reaching of superior results than those reached by the majority of independence 
                                                          
17
 Rule C.3.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
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directors. On the contrary, this result is inconsistent with the agency theory which 
emphasizes the independence of boards and committees in order to reduce the agency 
costs. Furthermore, again pursuant to our expectations, the more frequent AC meetings 
lead to both higher ROE as well as Tobin’s Q. This is in line with the resource 
dependence theory that predicts the higher firm performance with higher frequency of 
the AC meetings. The most controversial result appears to be the one obtained when 
examining the financial experience of AC members. On the one hand, the study shows 
that it positively affects ROE, but on the other hand no significant relationship with 
Tobin’s Q was proved. 
The results of this study must draw the attention of regulators who constantly advocate 
an increase in the independence of audit committees. 
As each study, this one also has some limitations. It focuses only on certain corporate 
governance mechanisms regarding audit committees. Future studies can include more 
independent variables such as board size and composition, duality of leadership, board 
diversity, institutional ownership that may possibly affect the firm performance. 
Alternatively, future study can examine other AC characteristics, different from 
examined in this work, such as the financial experience of its chair. Furthermore, the 
study considers FTSE 100 Index, future study can consider FTSE 250 in order to get 
even bigger sample. Another suggestion can be to include different firm performance 
indicators, such as ROA. This research can be also conducted on an industry basis. 
Finally, this research can consider the endogenous nature of this topic by using 
a simultaneous equation model. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1 – List of Companies with Industry Specification 
Table 17: Overview of the sample of 72 UK companies with the industry specification 
Number Company Industry 
1 ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS PLC Aerospace and defence 
2 BAE SYSTEMS PLC Aerospace and defence 
3 GKN PLC Aerospace and defence 
4 COCA-COLA HBC AG Beverages 
5 DIAGEO PLC Beverages 
6 SABMILLER PLC Beverages 
7 JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC Chemicals 
8 CRH PLC Construction and Materials 
9 SSE PLC Electricity 
10 MORRISON (WM) SUPERMARKETS PLC Food and Drug Retailers 
11 SAINSBURY (J) PLC Food and Drug Retailers 
12 TESCO PLC Food and Drug Retailers 
13 ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOOD PLC Food Producers 
14 MONDI PLC Forestry and Paper 
15 CENTRICA PLC Gas, Water and Multiutilities 
16 NATIONAL GRID PLC Gas, Water and Multiutilities 
17 SEVERN TRENT PLC Gas, Water and Multiutilities 
18 UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC Gas, Water and Multiutilities 
19 REXAM PLC General Industrials 
20 DIXONS CARPHONE PLC General Retailers 
21 KINGFISHER PLC General Retailers 
22 MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP PLC General Retailers 
23 NEXT PLC General Retailers 
24 MEDICLINIC INTERNATIONAL PLC Health Care Equipment and 
Services  
25 SMITH AND NEPHEW PLC Health Care Equipment and 
Services  
26 BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
27 BERKELEY GROUP HOLDINGS (THE) 
PLC 
Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
28 PERSIMMON PLC Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
29 RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
30 TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC Household Goods and Home 
Construction 
31 ROYAL MAIL PLC Industrial Transportation 
32 INFORMA PLC Media 
33 ITV PLC Media 
34 PEARSON PLC Media 
35 RELX PLC Media 
36 SKY PLC Media 
37 WPP PLC Media 
38 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC Mining 
39 ANTOFAGASTA PLC Mining 
40 BHP BILLITON PLC Mining 
41 FRESNILLO PLC Mining 
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42 GLENCORE PLC Mining 
43 RANDGOLD RESOURCES LD Mining 
44 RIO TINTO PLC Mining 
45 INMARSAT PLC Mobile Telecommunications 
46 VODAFONE GROUP PLC Mobile Telecommunications 
47 BP PLC Oil and Gas Producers 
48 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC  Oil and Gas Producers 
49 BURBERRY GROUP PLC Personal Goods 
50 UNILEVER PLC Personal Goods 
51 ASTRAZENECA PLC Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
52 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
53 SHIRE PLC Pharmaceuticals and 
Biotechnology 
54 SAGE GROUP PLC Software and Computer Services 
55 ASHTEAD GROUP PLC Support Services 
56 BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP 
PLC 
Support Services 
57 BUNZL PLC Support Services 
58 CAPITA PLC Support Services 
59 DCC PLC Support Services 
60 EXPERIAN PLC Support Services 
61 INTERTEK GROUP PLC Support Services 
62 TRAVIS PERKINS PLC Support Services 
63 WOLSELEY PLC Support Services 
64 ARM HOLDINGS PLC Technology Hardware and 
Equipment 
65 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC Tobacco 
66 COMPASS GROUP PLC Travel and Leisure 
67 EASYJET PLC Travel and Leisure 
68 INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP 
PLC 
Travel and Leisure 
69 MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS PLC Travel and Leisure 
70 PADDY POWER BEDFAIR PLC Travel and Leisure 
71 TUI AG Travel and Leisure 
72 WHITBREAD PLC Travel and Leisure 
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Figure 02: Overview of the industries 
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Annex 2 – Audit Committee Data 
Table 18: Audit committee data 
Company Year 
Size of 
AC 
Num. of meetings 
per year 
Num. of indep. 
directors 
Num. of directors 
with fin. exp. 
ROLLS-ROYCE 
HOLDINGS PLC 
2015 5 4 5 3 
2014 4 5 4 2 
2013 4 4 4 3 
2012 4 4 4 3 
2011 4 4 4 3 
BAE SYSTEMS PLC 
2015 3 5 3 2 
2014 3 7 3 2 
2013 3 6 3 2 
2012 3 6 3 1 
2011 3 6 3 1 
GKN PLC 
2015 4 6 4 4 
2014 4 5 4 4 
2013 4 4 4 4 
2012 4 4 4 4 
2011 5 5 5 5 
COCA-COLA HBC AG 
2015 4 9 4 2 
2014 3 9 3 1 
2013 3 8 3 1 
2012 3 8 3 1 
2011 3 7 3 1 
DIAGEO PLC 
2015 8 4 8 1 
2014 8 4 8 1 
2013 8 4 8 1 
2012 8 6 8 1 
2011 8 6 8 1 
SABMILLER PLC 
2015 5 4 4 4 
2014 5 4 4 3 
2013 5 4 4 2 
2012 6 4 5 4 
2011 6 4 5 4 
JOHNSON MATTHEY 
PLC 
2015 5 5 5 2 
2014 5 5 5 2 
2013 5 5 5 2 
2012 6 4 6 2 
2011 6 4 6 2 
CRH PLC 
2015 4 9 4 1 
2014 5 10 5 1 
2013 5 8 5 1 
2012 5 8 5 1 
2011 4 9 4 1 
SSE PLC 
2015 5 3 5 2 
2014 3 3 3 1 
2013 4 3 4 1 
2012 4 3 4 1 
2011 4 3 4 1 
MORRISON (WM) 
SUPERMARKETS 
PLC 
2015 4 7 4 1 
2014 4 6 4 1 
2013 4 9 4 1 
2012 4 6 4 1 
2011 4 6 4 1 
SAINSBURY (J) PLC 
2015 3 5 3 1 
2014 3 4 3 1 
2013 3 4 3 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
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TESCO PLC 
2015 6 8 6 4 
2014 4 5 4 4 
2013 4 5 4 2 
2012 4 5 4 2 
2011 5 5 5 3 
ASSOCIATED 
BRITISH FOOD PLC 
2015 5 5 5 1 
2014 4 5 4 1 
2013 3 4 3 1 
2012 3 4 3 1 
2011 3 4 3 1 
MONDI PLC 
2015 3 4 3 1 
2014 3 4 3 1 
2013 3 4 3 1 
2012 3 4 3 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
CENTRICA PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 6 4 6 2 
2013 6 4 6 2 
2012 5 4 5 2 
2011 6 4 6 2 
NATIONAL GRID 
PLC 
2015 4 8 1 1 
2014 5 6 1 1 
2013 6 6 2 2 
2012 5 6 1 1 
2011 4 6 1 1 
SEVERN TRENT PLC 
2015 4 4 4 4 
2014 4 4 4 4 
2013 3 5 3 2 
2012 3 4 3 2 
2011 3 5 3 2 
UNITED UTILITIES 
GROUP PLC 
2015 3 4 3 1 
2014 4 4 4 1 
2013 4 4 4 1 
2012 3 5 3 1 
2011 3 4 3 1 
REXAM PLC 
2015 3 5 3 1 
2014 3 4 3 1 
2013 3 4 3 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 3 4 3 1 
DIXONS CARPHONE 
PLC 
2015 3 3 3 1 
2014 4 3 4 1 
2013 3 3 3 1 
2012 3 3 3 1 
2011 5 4 5 1 
KINGFISHER PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 4 4 4 1 
2013 4 4 4 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
MARKS AND 
SPENCER GROUP 
PLC 
2015 6 5 6 1 
2014 6 6 6 2 
2013 5 5 5 3 
2012 6 6 6 2 
2011 6 5 6 2 
NEXT PLC 
2015 5 5 5 1 
2014 5 4 5 1 
2013 5 4 5 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 5 4 1 
MEDICLINIC 2015 4 3 4 1 
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INTERNATIONAL 
PLC 
2014 4 4 4 1 
2013 4 3 4 1 
2012 4 3 4 1 
2011 4 3 4 1 
SMITH AND 
NEPHEW PLC 
2015 5 7 5 1 
2014 4 5 4 1 
2013 4 8 4 1 
2012 5 8 5 1 
2011 5 6 5 1 
BARRATT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 5 4 5 1 
2013 6 5 6 1 
2012 3 3 3 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
BERKELEY GROUP 
HOLDINGS (THE) 
PLC 
2015 4 3 4 2 
2014 5 3 5 3 
2013 4 3 4 1 
2012 3 3 3 1 
2011 3 3 3 1 
PERSIMMON PLC 
2015 4 6 4 3 
2014 3 4 3 2 
2013 3 6 3 3 
2012 3 4 3 3 
2011 3 4 3 3 
RECKITT 
BENCKISER GROUP 
PLC 
2015 5 4 5 2 
2014 5 4 5 4 
2013 3 4 3 2 
2012 3 4 3 2 
2011 3 4 3 2 
TAYLOR WIMPEY 
PLC 
2015 4 3 4 2 
2014 4 3 4 1 
2013 4 3 4 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 3 3 3 1 
ROYAL MAIL PLC 
2015 6 5 6 2 
2014 6 9 6 2 
2013 6 5 6 2 
2012 6 5 6 1 
2011 6 5 6 1 
INFORMA PLC 
2015 5 3 5 2 
2014 4 3 4 2 
2013 4 3 4 2 
2012 3 3 3 2 
2011 3 3 3 2 
ITV PLC 
2015 3 7 3 1 
2014 3 5 3 1 
2013 4 5 4 1 
2012 3 4 3 1 
2011 3 8 3 1 
PEARSON PLC 
2015 5 4 5 1 
2014 6 5 6 1 
2013 5 5 5 1 
2012 6 4 6 1 
2011 7 4 7 1 
RELX PLC 
2015 4 7 4 2 
2014 3 5 3 2 
2013 4 5 4 2 
2012 4 5 4 3 
2011 4 5 4 3 
SKY PLC 
2015 4 6 4 4 
2014 5 6 5 5 
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2013 4 6 4 4 
2012 5 6 5 5 
2011 3 4 3 3 
WPP PLC 
2015 7 8 7 1 
2014 4 9 4 1 
2013 5 7 5 1 
2012 4 9 4 1 
2011 4 7 4 1 
ANGLO AMERICAN 
PLC 
2015 5 4 5 1 
2014 6 3 6 1 
2013 6 4 6 1 
2012 5 3 5 1 
2011 4 3 4 1 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC 
2015 3 4 3 2 
2014 3 4 3 2 
2013 3 6 3 2 
2012 3 5 3 2 
2011 3 5 3 2 
BHP BILLITON PLC 
2015 5 8 5 1 
2014 4 9 4 1 
2013 4 12 4 1 
2012 5 11 5 1 
2011 4 9 4 1 
FRESNILLO PLC 
2015 3 5 3 1 
2014 3 5 3 1 
2013 3 5 3 1 
2012 3 5 3 1 
2011 3 5 3 1 
GLENCORE PLC 
2015 3 4 3 3 
2014 3 4 3 3 
2013 3 4 3 3 
2012 3 5 3 2 
2011 3 2 3 2 
RANDGOLD 
RESOURCES LD 
2015 4 6 4 4 
2014 4 6 4 4 
2013 3 6 3 3 
2012 3 6 3 3 
2011 3 6 3 3 
RIO TINTO PLC 
2015 5 6 5 1 
2014 5 6 5 1 
2013 4 7 4 1 
2012 4 6 4 1 
2011 5 6 5 1 
INMARSAT PLC 
2015 5 4 5 3 
2014 4 4 4 3 
2013 4 4 4 3 
2012 4 5 4 3 
2011 4 4 4 3 
VODAFONE GROUP 
PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 4 4 4 1 
2013 4 4 4 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
BP PLC 
2015 5 11 5 1 
2014 4 13 4 1 
2013 4 12 4 1 
2012 4 11 4 1 
2011 4 11 4 1 
ROYAL DUTCH 
SHELL PLC  
2015 4 6 4 1 
2014 4 6 4 1 
2013 4 6 4 1 
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2012 4 5 4 1 
2011 4 5 4 1 
BURBERRY GROUP 
PLC 
2015 8 3 8 1 
2014 6 3 6 1 
2013 5 3 5 1 
2012 5 3 5 1 
2011 5 5 5 3 
UNILEVER PLC 
2015 4 8 4 4 
2014 4 8 4 1 
2013 4 9 4 4 
2012 3 7 3 3 
2011 3 5 3 3 
ASTRAZENECA PLC 
2015 5 5 5 1 
2014 5 5 5 1 
2013 5 5 5 1 
2012 5 7 5 1 
2011 5 6 5 1 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 
PLC 
2015 8 6 8 3 
2014 8 6 8 3 
2013 8 6 8 3 
2012 7 6 7 3 
2011 7 6 7 3 
SHIRE PLC 
2015 5 5 5 1 
2014 5 6 5 1 
2013 3 5 3 1 
2012 3 5 3 1 
2011 4 5 4 1 
SAGE GROUP PLC 
2015 5 4 5 1 
2014 5 5 5 1 
2013 5 4 5 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
ASHTEAD GROUP 
PLC 
2015 3 5 3 1 
2014 4 5 4 2 
2013 3 5 3 1 
2012 3 4 3 1 
2011 3 4 3 1 
BABCOCK 
INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP PLC 
2015 6 4 6 1 
2014 5 4 5 1 
2013 5 4 5 1 
2012 6 4 6 1 
2011 5 4 5 1 
BUNZL PLC 
2015 5 4 5 1 
2014 5 5 5 1 
2013 5 5 5 1 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 3 4 1 
CAPITA PLC 
2015 5 7 4 1 
2014 4 9 3 1 
2013 4 6 3 1 
2012 4 6 4 1 
2011 3 5 3 1 
DCC PLC 
2015 4 6 4 4 
2014 4 4 4 4 
2013 4 4 4 1 
2012 3 7 3 3 
2011 3 5 3 3 
EXPERIAN PLC 
2015 7 4 7 3 
2014 8 5 8 2 
2013 7 4 7 2 
2012 6 4 6 1 
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2011 6 4 6 1 
INTERTEK GROUP 
PLC 
2015 4 5 4 2 
2014 4 5 4 3 
2013 4 5 4 3 
2012 3 5 3 3 
2011 4 5 4 4 
TRAVIS PERKINS 
PLC 
2015 4 4 4 3 
2014 4 4 4 3 
2013 4 4 4 3 
2012 3 4 3 2 
2011 3 5 3 2 
WOLSELEY PLC 
2015 6 5 6 3 
2014 7 4 7 4 
2013 6 4 6 3 
2012 4 4 4 1 
2011 4 4 4 1 
ARM HOLDINGS PLC 
2015 4 7 4 1 
2014 5 6 5 1 
2013 4 6 4 1 
2012 4 6 4 2 
2011 4 5 4 2 
BRITISH AMERICAN 
TOBACCO PLC 
2015 4 6 4 2 
2014 4 5 4 2 
2013 4 5 4 2 
2012 4 5 4 3 
2011 4 5 4 1 
COMPASS GROUP 
PLC 
2015 7 3 7 1 
2014 5 4 5 1 
2013 5 3 5 1 
2012 5 4 5 1 
2011 5 4 5 1 
EASYJET PLC 
2015 3 4 3 3 
2014 4 3 4 4 
2013 3 3 3 3 
2012 3 3 3 1 
2011 4 3 4 1 
INTERCONTINENTA
L HOTELS GROUP 
PLC 
2015 6 5 6 1 
2014 6 5 6 2 
2013 5 5 5 2 
2012 4 5 4 1 
2011 4 5 4 1 
MERLIN 
ENTERTAINMENTS 
PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 3 5 3 1 
2013 3 1 3 1 
2012 4 2 4 4 
2011 4 2 4 4 
PADDY POWER 
BEDFAIR PLC 
2015 4 4 4 3 
2014 4 7 4 2 
2013 4 5 4 1 
2012 4 5 4 1 
2011 3 7 3 1 
TUI AG 
2015 7 6 7 3 
2014 6 4 6 2 
2013 6 5 6 2 
2012 6 4 6 2 
2011 6 6 6 2 
WHITBREAD PLC 
2015 4 4 4 1 
2014 5 4 5 1 
2013 6 3 6 1 
2012 3 3 3 1 
2011 3 3 3 1 
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Annex 3 – The Results of the Regressions 
Table 19: The estimation output (equation 4.1.1) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/29/16   Time: 23:57   
Sample: 2011 2015   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 72   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 340  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.968897 4.866478 1.021046 0.3080 
FSIZE -3.676244 2.227430 -1.650442 0.0998 
FLEV 1.055618 0.826902 1.276594 0.2026 
ACSIZE 1.413908 0.321822 7.500761 0.0000 
ACMEET 0.184835 0.021856 3.681258 0.0003 
ACINDEP -1.080597 0.668504 -1.903912 0.0578 
ACFINEXP 1.953980 0.839501 5.411240 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.109373    Mean dependent var 17.94459 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082302    S.D. dependent var 13.97940 
S.E. of regression 13.39178    Akaike info criterion 8.058977 
Sum squared resid 59002.77    Schwarz criterion 8.182855 
Log likelihood -1359.026    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.108337 
F-statistic 4.040263    Durbin-Watson stat 0.663486 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000030    
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Table 20: The estimation output (equation 4.1.2) 
 
Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/30/16   Time: 00:09   
Sample: 2011 2015   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 71   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 348  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.244695 0.517840 8.196928 0.0000 
FSIZE -2.494415 0.156438 -15.94506 0.0000 
FLEV 0.027589 0.033699 0.818697 0.4135 
ACSIZE 0.093351 0.041975 2.223947 0.0268 
ACMEET 0.169638 0.017177 9.876183 0.0000 
ACINDEP -1.092487 0.066810 -16.35220 0.0000 
ACFINEXP -0.611123 0.354526 -1.723773 0.1857 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.257308    Mean dependent var 1.898431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235269    S.D. dependent var 2.776939 
S.E. of regression 2.428402    Akaike info criterion 4.643443 
Sum squared resid 1987.335    Schwarz criterion 4.765208 
Log likelihood -796.9590    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.691920 
F-statistic 11.67546    Durbin-Watson stat 0.101352 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
